• We propose a novel CSKA scheme to provide enhanced user privacy for continuous LBSs.
Introduction
With the proliferation of wireless communication and mobile phones featuring global positioning system (GPS), location-based services (LBSs) have attracted substantial interest and are becoming one of the fastest-growing services [1] [2] [3] . In an LBS, a mobile user sends a request containing his/her location and interests to a location service provider (LSP). The LSP returns the point of interests (POIs) near the user's current location (e.g., garages, car parks, supermarkets, and restaurants) according to the user's interests. However, the LSP has the potential to violate the user's other users, thereby providing K -anonymity [10, 11] . However, this degrades the POI service. Consequently, the POI results are returned to the anonymizer for refinement so that more accurate results can be returned to the user. While the user is likely to discard the results almost immediately, it is in the interests of the anonymizer to cache them in order to aid it to answer future requests. If other users can obtain their POI service directly from the anonymizer's cached results, it will not be required to send their requests to the LSP.
In Ref. [12] , we proposed a caching-based scheme to enhance user privacy for continuous LBSs; the scheme employs a twolevel caching to cache result data. However, this scheme does not consider the user's neighbor cache and the anonymity based on user mobility. To further enhance user privacy and increase cache hit rate, we propose an enhanced privacy protection scheme based on caching and spatial K -anonymity (CSKA) for continuous LBSs, in this paper. Our scheme adopts a multi-level caching to cache users' results. When a user issues a query request in continuous LBSs, he/she first queries the results in the cache of the local client, user's neighbor, and anonymizer in turn. If the user can obtain the results directly from these caches, he/she will not be required to interact with the LSP, and it will not expose any information to the untrusted LSP. Otherwise, a spatial K -anonymity that includes K cells [13] is formed by the anonymizer, and it is sent to the LSP for query. In the process of forming a spatial K -anonymity, our scheme first utilizes the Markov model to predict the next query location according to the user mobility; then, it selects K cells based on the predicted location, cell's cache contribution rate, and data freshness to improve the cache hit rate, consequently reducing the number of the interactions between the user and LSP and minimizing the overhead of the LBS server.
The main contributions of this study are as follows:
(1) We propose a novel CSKA scheme to provide enhanced user privacy for continuous LBSs. Our scheme adopts multi-level caching to cache users' results; moreover, a few of the user queries can be answered directly by cache, which can reduce the risk of exposure of user information to untrusted LSP.
(2) We employ spatial K -anonymity to enhance user privacy. According to the cells that the user are required to query, the anonymizer selects K cells to form a cloaking region, which can conceal the real user's location. (3) We utilize the Markov model to predict the users' next location according to the user's mobility. To improve the cache hit rate, the cloaking region will be formed according to the predicted location, cell's cache contribution rate, and data freshness, thus reducing the interaction between the users and LSP.
(4) We analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed CSKA scheme. The simulation results reveal that our proposed CSKA scheme can provide higher privacy protection than a few previous methods and that it can minimize the overhead of the LBS server.
The rest of this research paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 provides a general overview of our system model and the fundamental definition. Section 4 presents details of the proposed scheme. A detailed discussion on the security analysis is presented in Section 5, and an analysis of the system's performance-efficiency is presented clearly in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
Related work
In this section, we review certain available research on system architectures, the main techniques, and cache methods for privacy preservation in LBSs.
Architectures
There are mainly two types of commonly-used architectures of privacy preservation in LBSs: user-centralized architecture [14] and centralized architecture [15] .
In the user-centralized architecture, users can communicate with an LSP directly. Prior to sending queries, the users are generally required to blur their location information. The typical methods include generating fake locations, adding noise, and forming anonymity. The advantage of this architecture is its convenient deployment. However, for a user requiring high privacy protection, these methods for blurring user location will substantially reduce his/her experience.
The centralized architecture introduces a trusted third-party component called anonymizer, which sits between the users and LSP. The main role of the anonymizer is to perform location anonymity so that the LSP cannot identify the real user from the other users, thereby protecting the privacy of the user. The introduction of the anonymizer improves the capability to protect user privacy. However, as all the submitted queries of users have to go through the anonymizer, it will be the performance bottleneck of this architecture.
Techniques
At present, certain techniques of location privacy protection have been proposed in LBSs. Generally, we classify them into two main categories: dummy-based techniques and generalized techniques.
In the dummy-based techniques, there are mainly fake location methods and pseudonym methods. The former primarily conceals the user's query by generating a few fake locations in order to reduce the risk of user privacy exposure [16] . For example, Zhang et al. [17] presented a method of generating fake locations uniformly according to the actual road network. The method is simple and incurs marginal computational overhead. However, it is challenging to effectively generate fake locations according to the actual situation to confound an attacker. The pseudonym methods conceal the user's true identity by using the user's temporary identity, so that the attacker cannot be associated with the real user. For example, Gong et al. [18] presented an incentive strategy to motivate users to change their pseudonyms according to the social relationship between mobile social groups. The user privacypreserving degree of this method depends mainly on the association between the user's identity and the special location; therefore, the user needs to change his/her pseudonym frequently.
The generalized techniques ordinarily generalize a query point of a user into an area and then sends it to the LSP for query; thus, the attacker only knows that the user is in a specific region [19] . The typical method is K -anonymity, which forms a cloaking region containing at least K users; the attacker cannot distinguish a particular user from the other K − 1 users. For example, Zhang et al. [20] presented a dual privacy-preserving scheme to protect user's trajectories and content privacy; here, the user can select different anonymizers to form the cloaking region. Zhao et al. [21] proposed a K -anonymity solution to prevent injection attacks against user location, in which the attacker cannot obtain knowledge about the user's fake location. In general, the generalized techniques increase the overhead of the LBS server because it provides inaccurate location queries to LSP. Furthermore, using only this technology in continuous LBSs can provide limited privacy protection.
Cache methods
In a few recent works, the cache methods have been applied to user privacy protection, and users can employ the cached data of previous queries to answer subsequent queries. For example, Amini et al. [22] designed a system architecture involving the prefetching of the service data to enhance user privacy; however, the mobile user needs to cache a large amount of data during the query. Shokri et al. [23] proposed a distributed privacy protection scheme based on a collaborative group in the LBS. Before a mobile user issues a query request to the LSP, he /she first queries his/her neighbors for service data to reduce the probability of location exposure. However, the solution does not pay attention to the design of the caching strategy to enhance user privacy. Park et al. [24] proposed a location-based cache strategy to support spatial query processing; furthermore, a mobile user pre-fetches data that are likely to be used in the near future. However, it is suitable only for wireless broadcast environments. Jung et al. [25] proposed a privacy-preserving scheme that employs a virtual individual server to preserve the location privacy in an LBS; this can prevent system performance degradation during anonymity through collaborative caching. Peng et al. [26] presented a privacy protection scheme that protects user trajectories through collaborative caching. It is challenging for an attacker to reconstruct the user's trajectory. Zhang et al. [27] presented a scheme to enhance user privacy protection through unified grid and cache. This scheme can prevent different users from querying an identical region; however, the overhead of the client is large. Niu et al. [28] presented a cachingbased scheme in which two cache-based dummy location selection algorithms are designed to enhance user location privacy; however, this method is not well suited for continuous queries.
None of the above studies considered the user mobility in continuous LBSs. As a departure from these, we propose a method to form a cloaking region based on user mobility and adopt multilevel caching to improve user privacy.
The system model and definition
This section first describes the CSKA scheme to provide enhanced privacy in continuous LBSs. Then, we state the motivation for this work. Finally, we define the adversary model, privacy metric, and Markov model.
System architecture
To improve user privacy, we propose a CSKA scheme in continuous LBSs; its architecture is shown in Fig. 1 . It is a centralized architecture with three main entities: mobile clients, anonymizer, and LSP. Their main functions can be described as follows:
Mobile clients. Each mobile client carries a mobile device with rudimentary functions such as information processing, data storage, and global positioning (e.g., GPS); more importantly, it exhibits short-distance communication capabilities through wireless communication protocols such as IEEE 802.11, Bluetooth [29] , and Radio Frequency IDentification [30] , and it communicates with other mobile users around it [31, 32] . Mobile clients can also collaborate to share query content in each other's cache.
Anonymizer. An anonymizer is a trusted entity between the mobile clients and LSP. Its main function is to form spatial Kanonymity and cache users' query results. It can also collect all the users' query information and count the number of queries issued in each cell in the past. In the process of continuous LBSs, an anonymizer can predict the user's next query according to the user mobility.
LSP. An LSP is an online location-based service solution provider with a number of LBS application servers that store map resources and location-related POIs such as restaurants, hotels, and supermarkets [33, 34] . It can provide users with timely location-based comprehensive query service. When receiving a user query request, it searches the database for the POIs that satisfies the user's needs according to the clocking region provided by the anonymizer and returns it to the user via the anonymizer.
The CSKA scheme adopts multi-level caching to reduce the risk of exposure of users' information to an LSP and combines spatial Kanonymity to enhance user privacy. The work process is as follows:
(1) When a user issues a query request in continuous LBSs, he/she first queries in the cache of the local client, user's neighbors, and anonymizer in turn. If the service data in the cache can satisfy the user's requirements, the user obtains the query results directly.
(2) Otherwise, the user's query request is sent to the anonymizer to form a spatial K -anonymity. We utilize the Markov model to predict the users' next location according to the user mobility and select K cells to form a cloaking region based on the predicted location, cell's cache contribution rate, and data freshness.
(3) Then, the cloaking region is sent to the LSP for query, and the LSP searches the POIs within the user query range from the database, obtains the query results, and returns them to the anonymizer.
(4) The anonymizer updates the query results to the cache and returns the matched user service data to the user. Similarly, the user also updates the cache and refines the matched service data to obtain accurate results.
Problem statement
In LBSs, users need to send information related to the current location to an untrusted LSP to obtain the desired service. We consider the following scenario: In densely populated areas, numerous mobile users need to send continuous range queries to an LSP that queries the same POIs, such as discounted information for nearby restaurants. There are two concerns: first, during continuous LBS queries, the submitted queries include the current locations and interests of the mobile user, and a user frequently submits these queries to the untrusted LSP; this increases the risk of identification of his/her trajectory by the LSP. Secondly, different users send the same query request to the LSP for repeated queries; this increases the risk of exposure of the user's privacy and the overhead of the LBS server. For the first issue, the general approach is to use Kanonymity; however, the selected dummy locations are vulnerable to data mining attacks aimed at identifying the real user. On the second question, we naturally consider the caching method, which permits users to obtain data directly from the cache; this enhances the user privacy and reduces the overhead of the LBS server. Nevertheless, improving the cache hit rate is a challenging problem.
To address the issues mentioned above, the fundamental concept of our proposed scheme is to integrate caching and spatial K -anonymity to provide enhanced privacy. Our solution employs a multi-level caching to cache the data previously queried by the user on the local client, user's neighbor, and anonymizer for subsequent queries to mitigate the risk of exposure of user information to an untrusted LSP. To improve the cache hit rate, we use Markovbased location prediction to predict the user's next location according to the user mobility in continuous LBS queries and select K cells to form a cloaking region according to the predicted location, cell's cache contribution rate, and data freshness. Simultaneously, in order to solve the risk of exploitation of the dummy location in K -anonymity, we adopt spatial K -anonymity to further enhance user privacy.
Adversary model and privacy metric
In our system, we assume that both the anonymizer and the mobile clients are trusted entities. The initiating query user and the neighboring users within the user's communication range will not collect the data information of the other party from the peer node and will not send malicious information to the other node. Additionally, the communication channel between them is secure, and available security schemes such as cryptographic and hashing algorithms can be employed to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the transmitted data [35] [36] [37] .
In our adversary model, we regard the main purpose of an adversary as the determination of the users' location associated with the true identity; the knowledge of the adversary is an important factor in assessing our scheme's privacy. Therefore, according to the background knowledge gained by the adversary, our scheme mainly considers two types of adversary models.
(1) The LSP in the system is regarded as an honest albeit curious entity that straightforwardly obtains all the user query information by monitoring the queries sent by the user; it also knows the privacy protection mechanisms used in the system. Based on this information, it can attempt to infer certain information related to the user's location, and it may even leak the user's sensitive information to a third party.
(2) An adversary may collect certain user query information by eavesdropping on the communication channel between the user and LSP and attempt to obtain certain sensitive information about the user from the data, such as the user identity, sensitive query content, and location. It generally exhibits limited background knowledge of the user and can be localized and short-term operated.
In this paper, we quantify location privacy by entropy-based metrics [38] , which is mainly determined by two factors. One is that the user obtains the privacy degree when he/she sends a query to the LSP. The other is the effect of caching, because certain users' query requests are answered by cached data. We will evaluate the privacy of our system mainly based on the cache hit rate; a higher cache hit rate indicates that fewer user queries are sent to the LSP, which can mitigate the risk of exposure of user information.
Markov model
In daily life, a user's mobility generally exhibits certain regularity, such as a fixed location that the user has to pass in turn on the way to and from work. In this study, we use the Markov model to predict the user's next query location according to the user mobility and select K cells to form spatial K -anonymity according to the predicted location; this can improve the cache hit rate of the user's next query.
The trajectory T of a moving object can be represented by a set of discrete two-tuple locations l at sampling time, which can be expressed as follows:
where p i denotes the ith point of trajectory T and
be denoted by a two-tuple (x, y), where x and y represent latitude and longitude, respectively.
A mobile user's trajectory can be expressed as an nth order Markov chain; the location l i of each sampling point p i on the The query request from user to anonymizer MSG A2S Anonymizer forwards the user's request to LSP MSG S2A LSP returns the candidate results to anonymizer MSG A2U The matched results return from anonymizer to user trajectory is related only to the n positions {p i−n+1 , p i−n+2 , . . . , [39, 40] .
where p i · l = l i denotes the location of sampling point p i on the trajectory. For the first n locations on the trajectory, the next location can be predicted by Eq. (3):
where l p denotes the predicted next location on the trajectory. Therefore, there are n candidate locations on the user's trajectory. We can predict the next location by calculating the maximum probability of l k .
Our proposed CSKA scheme
In this section, we first elaborate the process of LBS query in our proposed scheme. Then, we introduce the process of location prediction based on Markov. Finally, we present the method of cloaking region formation. The important notations used in our CSKA scheme are listed in Table 1 for reference.
Process of LBS query
Our system first specifies a rectangular query area that is divided into M × M grid structure with the equal cell, and each cell has a unique identifier (c i , r j ), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ M. If a user's coordinate is (x i , y i ), its cell identifier (c i , r j ) can be computed by Eq. (4):
where
Then, our system sets a desired threshold θ (0 < θ ≤ 1) according to the tradeoff between service quality and privacy. In the process of searching for results in the cache, if the proportion of the matched cell identifiers in the cache is higher than θ, it implies that the cache can satisfy the user's query needs. That is, the user can obtain the query results directly from the cache without interacting with the LSP. The higher the value of θ is, the better the service quality will be, although it will reduce user privacy.
Query request
When a user issues a query request, he/she first identifies all the cell identifiers I q that cover the query range of radius R; here, Num() is a function for counting the number of cell identities, it implies that the client cache can satisfy the user's needs and that the user can obtain the result data directly. Otherwise, the user sends the POI type and the cell identifier set I 1 u = I q − I c that need to be queried to the cache of the neighbor clients for query. In mobile clients, we adopt the cooperative caching mechanism based on the signature augment tree structure proposed in reference [41] to achieve cache sharing among clients. Similarly, if the matched cell identifiers I n from the neighboring users satisfy (Num(I c ) + Num(I n ))/Num(I q ) ≥ θ, the user obtains the result data directly.
Otherwise, the user needs to send a request message MSG U2A to the anonymizer.
where l u indicates the location of the user's current query point, D u denotes the direction of user movement, I
2 u indicates the cell identifier set that needs to be queried, and I 2 u = I q −I c −I n . λ indicates the minimum number of cell identifiers that the anonymizer requires to query, and λ = θ * Num(I q ) − Num(I c ) − Num(I n ). k u indicates the randomly generated key of the user; and POI_type indicates the type of POI that the user queries, which is encrypted by asymmetric encryption E with the anonymizer's public key PK A .
When receiving the request message MSG U2A , the anonymizer first decrypts it with the private key SK A . Then, the anonymizer matches each cell identifier of I The detailed process of cloaking region formation is described in Section 4.3. Finally, the anonymizer forwards the user's request MSG A2S to the LSP. (6) where Region indicates the cloaking region and POI_type indicates the query content. Then, the anonymizer encrypts the Region and POI_type by asymmetric encryption E with the LSP's public key PK S .
MSG A2S = E PK S {Region, POI_type}

The results return
The LSP receives the MSG A2S , decrypts it with the private key SK S and obtains the K cells in the Region. Then, it searches the POIs according to the POI_type in these cells and obtains G POIs.
If the location of the jth POI is (x j , y j ) (1 ≤ i, j ≤ G), we can obtain the corresponding cell identifier for each POI by Eq. (4) and thus obtain the set ϕ r (1 ≤ r ≤ K ) of cell identifiers containing these POIs. Finally, the LSP encrypts the ϕ r by asymmetric encryption E with the anonymizer's public key PK A , forms the candidate result set message MSG S2A , and returns it to the anonymizer.
The anonymizer receives the MSG S2A ; it first decrypts it with the private key SK A and updates these POIs and corresponding cell identifiers to its cache. Then, the anonymizer matches the cell identifiers by comparing ϕ r (1 ≤ r ≤ K ) with the I 3 u previously needed be queried and obtains all the cell identifier set I 2 u along with the POIs that the user previously needs to query. Finally, the anonymizer encrypts the I 2 u along with the POIs by symmetric encryption En with the key k u . The query result message MSG A2U that the anonymizer forwards to the user is
The user receives the MSG A2U ; he/she first decrypts it with the key k u and updates it to the client cache. When the client cache cannot satisfy the storage requirements, we need to manage the cell identifiers along with the POIs in caching. In our scheme, we adopt the cache replacement strategy based on the user's movement trend. According to the user's current location and movement direction, we replace the cell identifiers together with the POIs that are farthest from the predicted location with the opposite movement direction; this can increase the cache hit rate. Finally, the user computes the POIs contained in the query range of radius R and obtains accurate results.
Location prediction based on Markov
In our CSKA scheme, we utilize the Markov model to predict the next location of a mobile user according to the user mobility and form a spatial K -anonymity based on the predicted location to enhance privacy. We first obtain certain stay points of significance from the users' historical trajectories. Then, we construct a Markov state-transit matrix comprising the probabilities of users moving between locations. Finally, we can predict the future states according to this matrix and the user's current state.
The stay points
In this section, we extract the stay points from the users' historical trajectories in the anonymizer. Suppose the historical trajectory of user u i is represented by 
where R is the radius of the earth,
, and x and y are the longitude and latitude of the moving position p a and p b . A stay point is the location at which a mobile user stays in the area within the distance ∆D r for at least ∆t r time; here, ∆D r and ∆t r are the thresholds of the distance and time, respectively. In our paper, the stay point is defined as a set of continuous positions that satisfy the following conditions:
For ∀m 
Markov chain
The Markov chain is used to describe the probabilities that a user moves from one location to another. We map the stay points of the users' historical trajectories to the cell identifiers by using the coordinates of the stay points, and the user trajectory can be represented by a sequence of the cell identifiers. Then, we construct a weighted graph G(V , E, W ); V indicates the set of cell identifiers, E indicates a set of edges from one cell identifier to another, and W indicates the weight of the edge. The weight w i→j of the edge (i, j) is defined as the number of movements of the user from position i to j. Finally, we can calculate the probability p i,j that a user moves from position i to j as follows:
As shown in Fig. 2 , a one-step state transition of the Markov chain occurs, and p 1,3 = 5/(5 + 3 + 2) = 50%. After counting all the transmissions on all the cells, we can obtain the Markov state-
The location prediction
According to the Markov state-transit matrix Pr and the user's current location l 
Forming cloaking region
In the process of forming a cloaking region, we select K cells to satisfy spatial K -anonymity according to the user's predicted location, cell's cache contribution rate, and data freshness to improve the cache hit rate. 
Cache contribution rate
As shown in Fig. 3 , this is a 7 × 7 grid structure with the equal cell, the density of points in the cell represents the probability that the user will issue a query. The blank cells indicate that these regions have almost no users' queries and are likely to have swamps, rugged mountains, or lakes on it. The user who needs to issue the query is in the cell A, and we need to select the other two cells to form a cloaking region. If we select the cells D and E, the attacker can conveniently infer the user's true cell by related background knowledge. To improve the cache contribution rate, we need to select other cells around the user with the highest query probability to form the clocking region. Therefore, we should select the cells B and C .
Suppose P i represents the probability that these users send queries in each cell, the cache contribution rate of the K − Num(I 3 u ) cells can be calculated by
P i , and
u ) cells to form the cloaking region, the cells should have the largest cache contribution rate C s :
Data freshness
The cached data of a cell has a certain lifetime. Before the cached data expires, we will update it, particularly for those cells that exhibit a high query probability. The data freshness of the cell can be expressed as
where T denotes the lifetime of the cached data and t denotes the time that the data has been cached. When a cloaking region is formed, the average data freshness of the selected K − Num(I
The cloaking region
Considering the above two factors, we select the cells that exhibit the maximum cache contribution rate and the minimum data freshness to form a cloaking region; the selected cell set can be represented as
Algorithm 2 illustrates the process of forming a cloaking region. We first count the number of cells that need to be queried and select N cells around the predicted location l p . Simultaneously, we select the 2K cells with the highest query probability from this N cells. Then, we randomly select W of the 2K cells as the candidate set C S , and the cache contribution rate and the data freshness of each candidate set are calculated. Finally, we obtain the maximum value C d of C S as the cell set selected in the cloaking region. 
8: end for
; 13: end for 14: return Region
Security analysis
In the next section, we perform a security analysis of the CSKA scheme to demonstrate how it can enhance user privacy. According to the adversary model defined in Section 3.3, the security of the proposed scheme is analyzed to demonstrate how it can protect against dishonest LSPs and/or eavesdropping attacks.
Privacy against LSP
When a user makes a query request, he/she first searches the results in the cache of the user, user's neighbor, and anonymizer in turn. If the cached data can satisfy the user's need, the user can obtain the result data directly. During this process, the user does not send any query to the untrusted LSP; therefore, the LSP cannot obtain any information from the user.
If the user cannot obtain the result that satisfies the user's needs in the cache, we need to form a cloaking region on the anonymizer; it is forwarded to the LSP by the anonymizer. However, the request message MSG A2S sent to the LSP contains only the query content POI_type and the cloaking region Region. From this information, the LSP only knows the user's POI_type, which cannot be associated with a specific user, and it does not obtain the exact location of the user.
In the process of forming a cloaking region, we select K cells to satisfy spatial K -anonymity based on the user's predicted location, cell's cache contribution rate, and data freshness. The cloaking region contains K cells, which do not necessarily contain the user's real location because the cell containing the user's real location may already have the result data in the cache. Even if the real user's location is in one of the K cells, we select other cells with the highest query probability as the cloaking region, and each cell contains certain users; therefore, the LSP can speculate that the probability of a specific user is at most 1/K . Although the LSP knows the query probability
2 ) of each cell in the grid structure, these cells are not focused on a sensitive area, and the LSP cannot successfully estimate the real location from the submitted cloaking region.
From the above analysis, we observe that our CSKA scheme can effectively resist the inference attack of the LSP.
Resistance to eavesdropping attacks
In the CSKA scheme, we employ cryptographic techniques to handle eavesdropping attacks using asymmetric and symmetric encryption to encrypt all the messages transmitted between the user and LSP.
When messages are sent to the anonymizer (either the request from the user or the results from the LSP), they are encrypted by asymmetric encryption using the public key of the anonymizer. Because an attacker will not have access to the anonymizer's private key, it cannot decrypt these messages.
When the anonymizer forwards the request message to the LSP, it is asymmetrically encrypted using the public key of the LSP. Because an attacker does not have access to the private key of the LSP, it cannot decrypt the request. The results message from the anonymizer to the user is symmetrically encrypted with a secret key known only to the anonymizer and user. Because an attacker does not have access to this, it cannot decrypt the results.
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed CSKA scheme and conduct our experiments focusing on the cache hit rate, system performance, and overhead of the LBS server.
Simulation setup
In our simulation, we deployed 20,000 mobile users on a 10 km × 10 km Beijing map; all of them followed a walking mobility model [42, 43] . The local map is divided into M × M cells, and the user query probability for each cell can be obtained through the Google Maps API. The user can issue successive LBS queries during the move, and we set ∆D r = 400 m and ∆t r = 30 min to obtain a few stay points. We randomly generated 10,000 POIs on the map, and they were set up as restaurants and hotels. The user can query the cached data of neighboring users within 50 m. The main experimental parameters are shown in Table 2 .
We carry out all the experiments on a PC with an Intel(R) Core(TM)i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40 GHz 3.41 GHz and 8 GB RAM; the CSKA schemes were implemented with the development environment of Java Development Kit and MyEclipse. We select the MobiCrowd [23] and CaDSA [28] schemes as the baseline algorithms. For continuous LBS queries, we measured the average processing times on the mobile clients, anonymizer, and LSP as well as the average communication cost between a user and the neighbors/anonymizer and that between the anonymizer and LSP.
Effectiveness analysis
The effectiveness of our CSKA scheme is mainly analyzed by changing the continuous query points n, anonymity degree K , and number of cells M.
The matching of the cells
When K = 30, M = 5000, and θ = 0.8, a user needs to query the POIs in the cells that are covered in the query range of radius R. When the user sends 10 continuous LBS queries, we analyze the proportion of matched cells in the local client, LSP, neighbors, and anonymizer. As observed in Fig. 4 , when the number of user's queries increases, the number of matched cells obtained from the local client, neighbors, and anonymizer gradually increases, whereas the number of matched cells obtained from the LSP gradually reduces; eventually, they tend to be in a relatively stable state. This is because when the user initially queries, the local client cache has almost no required POIs, and the user can only obtain result data from the surrounding neighbors, anonymizer, and LSP. In this query process, we utilize the Markov model to predict the next query location according to the user mobility and select K cells based on the predicted location, cell's cache contribution rate, and data freshness to form a spatial K -anonymity. Certain cells of the future query has been previously queried by the spatial Kanonymity, and these result data are stored in the cache of the mobile clients or anonymizer. Therefore, as the number of user queries increases, the query results obtained by the user from the local client, neighbors, and anonymizer increases, and only a small number of unmatched cells need to be queried by the LSP.
If the user can directly obtain the result data from the cache of the local client, the user's privacy is higher, and the system overhead is smaller. On the contrary, if the user obtains more result data from the LSP, the user's privacy reduces and the system overhead increases. As shown in this figure, when the number of queries increases, the proportion of the matched cells by the user from the local client, neighbors and anonymizer, and LSP is 22%, 69% and 9%, respectively. The comparison of the result data obtained from the different entities is presented in Table 3 .
Effect of number of cells M
In the case of θ = 0.8, n = 10 and K = 10, and 30 and 50, we evaluate the impact of the parameters M and K on the system performance. As observed in Fig. 5 , both the communication cost and the processing time increase with the increase in M. Moreover, the increase in the parameter K value also increases the system overhead. This is because the number of cells M increases and the user needs to match more cell identifiers within the specified query range, which increases the overhead for processing these cell identifiers. Similarly, for a larger K , the cloaking region that needs to be queried is larger, thus increasing the system overhead. Therefore, the system overhead of user queries increases with the increase in M and K .
Comparison
We mainly compare our CSKA scheme with the CaDSA and MobiCrowd methods in terms of cache hit rate and LBS server overhead to illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme.
Cache hit rate
When M = 5000 and n = 10, we compare the cache hit rate of the CaDSA, MobiCrowd, and CSKA methods under varying θ and K .
As shown in Fig. 6(a) , the cache hit rate of all the three methods decreased with the increase in θ at the K = 30; moreover, this rate for CSKA is higher than those for CaDSA and MobiCrowd. This is because with the increase in θ, the user needs to match more cell identifiers in the cache to satisfy the user's query requirements, and the cache hit rate will be reduced; however it can yield better service quality. Furthermore, the CSKA scheme is mainly based on the user's mobility to form the cloaking region; therefore, the CSKA exhibits a higher cache hit rate relative to the MobiCrowd and CaDSA methods.
As observed from Fig. 6(b) , the cache hit rate of all the three methods increased with K at θ = 0.8; moreover, the rate for CSKA is higher than those for CaDSA and MobiCrowd. This is because the anonymizer forms a larger cloaking region as K increases, and LSP returns more query results to the cache of the anonymizer and mobile clients to satisfy the users' query requirements; then, the cache hit rate increases accordingly. 
The overheard of the LBS server
When M = 5000, θ = 0.8, and K = 30, we compare the overhead of the CSKA, CaDSA, and MobiCrowd methods on the LBS server under varying n.
As observed from Fig. 7 , with the increase in n, the advantage of the CSKA method relative to the CaDSA and MobiCrowd methods is higher in terms of the processing time and communication cost of the LBS server. This is because the CSKA method selects K cells to form a cloaking region according to the predicted location, cell's cache contribution rate, and data freshness, thus effectively improving the cache hit ratio and reducing the number of user information queries in the LBS server. However, the MobiCrowd simply uses the cache, and the CaDSA considers only the user's query probability when forming a cloaking region. Therefore, the CSKA scheme has substantial advantages over the CaDSA and MobiCrowd methods in terms of the LBS server overhead.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a CSKA scheme which adopts multilevel caching and spatial K -anonymity to provide enhanced user privacy for continuous LBSs. When forming a spatial K -anonymity, our scheme first utilizes the Markov model to predict the next query location according to the user's mobility and then selects K cells based on the predicted location, cell's cache contribution rate, and data freshness to improve cache hit rate; this reduces the interaction between users and LSP and improves user privacy. Security analysis reveals that the CSKA scheme can effectively protect user privacy and that it can counter eavesdropping attacks and LSP inference attacks. The simulation results also verify that our proposed scheme exhibits higher privacy protection than the previous solutions.
In the process of forming spatial K -anonymity, we only consider selecting the cells to form a cloaking region based on the prediction location of a single user. However, we did not consider the case of multiple user queries. Therefore, in the future work, we will further consider the selection of appropriate cells based on multiple users' predicted locations to form a cloaking region when multiple users simultaneously issue queries so that they can achieve better privacy protection. This will also be a multi-objective optimization problem. Additionally, the security of information sharing between users and their neighbors is also an important issue worth studying.
